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On Business Cycles and
Countercyclical Policies
O
VER THE LAST TEN YEARS, THE U.S. ECONOMY EXPERIENCED ONE OF THE LONGEST ECO-
NOMIC EXPANSIONS IN ITS HISTORY. HOWEVER, SINCE THE THIRD QUARTER OF 2000, ITS
REAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP) HAS EXPERIENCED SIGNIFICANTLY LOWER RATES OF
GROWTH, ON AN ANNUALIZED BASIS, THAN THOSE OBSERVED BETWEEN 1996 AND MID-2000.
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Economists are still trying to assess the severity of
this slowdown, and this assessment has clearly be-
come more difficult since the events of September 11.
It is worth emphasizing that this article is silent
about the economic implications of wars and similar
cataclysms and focuses instead on the analysis of
“typical” business cycles. The slowdown that began
prior to September 11 had already served as a
reminder that the business cycle is still alive—that
the U.S. economy is likely to continue to experience
both expansions and contractions. This situation
raises the following questions: What do we know
about the driving forces behind the business cycle?
What should policymakers do in the face of eco-
nomic fluctuations?
Not surprisingly, there are a number of competing
explanations for business cycles, and there is no
shortage of policy recommendations. This article
focuses on only two of these explanations: the ani-
mal spirits theory and the real business cycle theory.
The former is closely connected with the Keynesian
economic tradition and identifies market partici-
pants’ mood swings as the key source of economic
fluctuations. The second explanation is rooted in the
classical economic tradition and views productivity
shocks as the driving force behind economic fluc-
tuations. These explanations are examined because
they are some of the better-known and most widely
quoted business cycle theories among academic
economists. Both theories meet modern academic
standards—one of them from its inception and the
other after a significant reformulation. Modern aca-
demic standards explicitly acknowledge the dynamic
nature of economic decisions—that macroeconomic
variables interact with each other in such a way that
the relevant economic relations must be considered
simultaneously—and the importance of microeco-
nomic theory as a sound foundation for macroeco-
nomic theory.
In addition to reviewing these two theories, the
article looks at what they suggest about counter-
cyclical policies—policies aimed at trying to elimi-
nate business cycle fluctuations or insulate market
participants from the effects of these fluctuations.
This article first presents the “everyday” adapta-
tion of the original animal spirits explanation for
business cycles and then sketches the foundations
of the real business cycle and the reformulated ani-
mal spirits explanations. The article next reviews
the real business cycle and Neo-Keynesian views and,
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The Keynesian (Nonfundamentals) Approach
O
ne popular explanation for the source of the
business cycle is that fluctuations in private
spending are induced by so-called animal
spirits.1 That is, economic fluctuations result from
waves of overpessimism or overoptimism, affecting
households and firms, that are not directly connected
to economic fundamentals but may nevertheless
become self-fulfilling.
A report on a popular Internet site earlier this year
reflects this belief. “The latest economic reports con-
firm what people on Wall Street and Main Street
already knew: the U.S. economy slowed sharply at the
end of last year. Consumers are largely to blame. They
reined in spending,
which accounts for
two-thirds of the U.S.
economy; as their con-
fidence fell to a four-




suggests that a fall in
consumer confidence,
induced perhaps by
animal spirits, has dri-
ven down personal
consumption expen-
ditures, in turn drag-
ging down output.
This logic is a faithful reproduction of the so-called
spending hypothesis attributed to Keynes and found
in many macroeconomics textbooks. In a review of
the Great Depression, Mankiw (1992a) addresses
the question that originally motivated Keynes: What
caused the Great Depression? Mankiw describes
what he calls the spending hypothesis of what
caused the Depression. “The spending hypothesis
. . . places primary blame for the Depression on an
exogenous fall in spending on goods and services.
Economists have attempted to explain this decline
in spending in several ways. Some argue that a
downward shift in the consumption function caused
the contractionary shift. . . . The stock market crash
of 1929 may have been partly responsible for this
decline in consumption. By reducing wealth and
increasing uncertainty about future prospects for
the U.S. economy, the crash may have induced con-
sumers to save more of their income [italics added]”
(1992a, 284–85).
In fairness to Keynes, his conjecture was that a
drop in consumption was part of the explanation
behind business cycles. The second part of the
explanation had to do with why the resources that
became available following a drop in aggregate con-
sumption did not find their way into the investment
sector of the economy, thus preventing market par-
ticipants’ mood swings from becoming self-fulfilling.
This question is a difficult one that many econo-
mists continue to struggle with, and therefore it is
not always reported in textbooks. Because many
commentators are exposed only to the first part of
Keynes’s explanation, it is referred to in this discus-
sion as the everyday Keynesian explanation. 
Of course, for this logic to apply, one would first
have to show that a fall in consumer confidence drags
down private consumption spending. Assuming for
the moment that this statement is true, the question
remains, Why would changes in private consumption
cause fluctuations in output or GDP? The explanation
according to the everyday Keynesian theory can be
illustrated as follows. Suppose a shoemaker’s cus-
tomers suddenly, for whatever reason, become very
pessimistic about their future income, inducing them
to slash their consumption across the board. As a con-
sequence, the shoemaker might see a significant drop
in shoe sales, forcing him to reduce his production.
Extrapolating from the shoemaker’s actions, commen-
tators might conclude that there is likely to be a drop
in GDP if most producers of consumer goods and ser-
vices experience a simultaneous decrease in sales.2 It
is clear, then, from this line of reasoning, that lower
private consumption spending causes lower output.
Despite its intuitive appeal, this analysis has been
the subject of criticism and qualifications by academic
economists for a number of decades. More recently,
these objections have stemmed from a theoretical
reexamination of the way households and firms make
their economic decisions at the microeconomic level
and economists beliefs about how these decisions
shape the evolution of the macroeconomy.
The next section presents a primer on the way
modern academic economists describe the economic
decisions of the two basic units that integrate the
macroeconomy: households and firms. These ideas
lay the foundations for the two business cycle theo-
ries this article examines.
The Economic Decisions of Households and Firms
M
acroeconomists build theoretical models
that are meant to provide a plausible repre-
sentation of a number of features in the
economy. Modern macroeconomists analyze models
in which households make consumption, savings,
and labor supply decisions over their lifetimes,
which span a large number of years, and firms make
their input choices so as to maximize their profits.
Households. For a given stream of projected
income, a household’s key economic decision, which
According to the real busi-
ness cycle theory, there is
nothing the government
can do to eliminate busi-
ness cycle fluctuations.
According to Farmer and
Guo, in contrast, govern-
ments may be able to
design policies to moderate
economic fluctuations.3 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2001
takes place continuously and is based in part on a
decision about how many hours to work, is how
much to consume and how much to save. This deci-
sion is also based on the household’s degree of fru-
gality. For a given level of income, the more frugal a
household is, the more it will save. Households also
prefer to avoid sharp swings in their consumption
patterns; for instance, most people would rather
have a moderately priced meal most of the time than
eat at La Tour d’Argent for a month and then starve
for the rest of the year. Finally, household savings
consist of increases in net acquisition of financial
assets in financial institutions. These institutions
lend most of their funds to the firms in the economy
to help them acquire capital.
Firms. Every production process, from fast food
restaurants to high-tech services, can be described
as the result of combining two basic inputs: capital
and labor. In most economic models, the goods that
households consume are produced by firms that use
labor and capital as inputs. The level of output
depends on the amount of labor supplied by the
households and on the amount of capital that has
been accumulated over time.
The Interaction of Households and Firms in
the Macroeconomy. The larger the number of
hours worked and the higher the level of accumu-
lated capital, the greater the output level in an econ-
omy. At the same time, capital enhances workers’
productivity. In a competitive marketplace, higher
productivity is normally associated with higher pay.
Firms choose the right mix of labor hours and capi-
tal to maximize their profits.
The more frugal the households in an economy
are—that is, the lower their contemporaneous con-
sumption expenditures—the more the households
will save and thus the more capital they will accu-
mulate. The larger the amount of capital in an econ-
omy, the larger the amount of output produced,
consumed, and invested. Hence, according to this
sketch of how households and firms make economic
decisions at the micro level, it is possible that lower
consumption today will result in higher output
levels tomorrow. Similarly, if animal spirits led
households to slash their consumption, for a given
level of income this reduced consumption would
result in higher savings, additional capital accumu-
lation, and higher output in the near future. Unlike
the everyday Keynesian explanation described ear-
lier, in which a decrease in consumption leads to a
fall in output, in modern macroeconomic models a
drop in consumption produces an increase in sav-
ings that will provide the necessary capital to fuel
economic growth.
An example of this phenomenon is the boom
Singapore experienced between 1960 and the mid-
1980s. Singapore, one of the four “Asian tigers,” saw
a decrease in consumption in the late 1970s. This
drop was caused by a marked increase in household
frugality and was matched by a sharp increase in the
savings rate, which facilitated an investment expan-
sion and an output boom.3 This example suggests
that, as modern macroeconomic analysis predicts,
lower consumption can cause higher GDP.
In sum, the everyday Keynesian analysis pre-
dicts that lower private consumption will always
lead to lower output. This prediction is inconsis-
tent with the modern macroeconomic analyses
described above and with the sequence of events
that occurred in Singapore.
The factors that determine how much an econ-
omy produces, consumes, and invests are known as
the economy’s fundamentals. These fundamentals
include the total number of hours worked and the
amount of capital in the economy. Economists also
recognize that there are additional fundamental fac-
tors that can help explain the ultimate level of GDP.
These additional factors are included in so-called
multifactor or total factor productivity (TFP).4
Factors affecting TFP include a country’s legal
framework, its infrastructure, and its level of techno-
logical sophistication. For a given number of hours
worked and a given level of capital in an economy,
higher TFP means higher production capacity. Thus,
TFP reflects the fact that output can be increased
not only by working harder but also by working
1. Originally, the term animal spirits was coined in the context of explaining wild investment swings. In Keynes’s words, “Most,
probably, of our decisions to do something positive . . . can only be taken as a result of animal spirits—of a spontaneous urge
to action rather than inaction. . . . If the animal spirits are dimmed and the spontaneous optimism falters . . . enterprise will
fade and die” (Keynes 1973, 161–62).
2. According to the same logic, a wave of overoptimism would lead to a sharp increase in the sales of consumer goods, and one
would expect a production boom.
3. As reported by Barro (1992), the ratio of real gross investment to real GDP in Singapore was about 13 percent in the early
1960s, reached 21 percent between 1965 and 1969, and then climbed to an average of 37 percent from 1970 to 1985. Per capita
real GDP growth rates from 1960 to 1985 were around 5.8 percent, whereas for the 1960–85 period per capita real consump-
tion grew by only 2.9 percent annually. Therefore, for the 1960–85 period, the relatively low growth in consumption was
matched by a sharp increase in the savings rate, which resulted in an investment and output boom.
4. Solow (1957) was the first economist to develop this idea.4 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2001
smarter, that is, by combining the same amounts of
inputs in a more efficient fashion.
In a market economy, individuals are rewarded
according to the amount of goods and services they
help produce. A higher level of capital per worker
allows workers to generate more goods and services
per unit of labor input and thus helps raise workers’
compensation. However, efficiency changes
(changes in TFP) can also help explain changes in
workers’ compensation. Other things being equal,
above-average rates of TFP growth (possibly the
result of technological innovation) generate higher
rates of growth in real (inflation-adjusted) wages
because workers are compensated for helping pro-
duce more goods and services. Higher wages, in
turn, result in increases in household income, lead-
ing to higher consumption and saving. Similarly,
below-average rates of TFP growth reduce the rate
of growth in real wages. Lower wages result in
decreases in household income, leading to lower
consumption and saving. In sum, random shifts in
TFP could cause fluctuations in the total output of
an economy. The view that total factor productivity
has an important role in economic fluctuations has
slowly made its way into business economics and
policy-making circles. For example, in recent testi-
mony (February 2001), Federal Reserve Chairman
Alan Greenspan stated that “crucial to the assess-
ment of the outlook . . . is the role of technological
change . . . in shaping cyclical forces.” 
The next section reviews the findings of a well-
known explanation for economic fluctuations: the
real business cycle (RBC) or fundamentals theory.
This theory relies on the foregoing analysis of the
two basic units that make up the macroeconomy—
households and firms.
Real Business Cycle Theory:
The Fundamentals Approach
K
ydland and Prescott (1982) and Long and
Plosser (1983) were the first economists to
recognize the possibility that business cycles
could be caused by random shocks to TFP (technol-
ogy shocks).5 They started with the observation that
in the post–Korean War U.S. economy, output, con-
sumption, investment, and labor hours are positively
correlated but differ in terms of their volatility over
the business cycle.
To illustrate this empirical fact, Chart 1 plots out-
put, consumption, investment, and labor hours in
the United States from the first quarter of 1954 to
the first quarter of 2001.6 These time series can be
thought of as consisting of two components: the
trend or low-frequency component, which changes
slowly over time, and the cyclical or high-frequency
component—the deviation of the series from its
trend—which moves up and down over the business
cycle. The statistical mathematical procedure that
decomposes a time series into these two compo-
nents is called detrending. The cyclical component
obtained after detrending is the object of business
cycle analysis. Chart 2 shows the cyclical compo-
nents (percentage deviations from trend) of some
actual U.S. time series.7 They represents the yard-






































U.S. Output, Consumption, Investment, and Labor Hours, 1954:Q1–2001:Q1
Source: Computed by the authors from data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Bureau of Labor Statistics.5 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2001
Chart 2 shows that consumption, investment, and
hours worked are all procyclical; that is, they all move
in the same direction as output over the business
cycle. Moreover, consumption displays a smoother
pattern than output, labor is about as volatile as out-
put, and investment is more volatile than output over
the business cycle. Table 1 shows summary statistics
on relative volatility and contemporaneous correla-
tion with output for key U.S. aggregates during the
sample period.8
Kydland and Prescott (1982) construct a model
that builds on the assumptions about the behavior
of households and firms that were sketched in the
preceding section. They assume that the prices of
different goods and services adjust readily in
response to changes in the economy’s fundamen-
tals. Furthermore, economywide production of
goods and services is assumed to yield constant
returns to scale—that is, a proportional increase in
the quantity of capital and labor inputs is expected
to increase output by the same proportion.
Chart 3 reproduces Chart 2 along with the cycli-
cal responses of output, consumption, investment,
and labor hours to technology shocks in a single sim-
ulation experiment conducted within an RBC model.
Although the model does a good job of matching the
relative volatility of the macroeconomic aggregates,
it does not capture the exact timing of the business
cycle. However, given the relative simplicity of the
model, it is remarkably successful in replicating the
cyclical behavior of key U.S. macroeconomic aggre-
gates revealed in Chart 2.9
Another way of assessing the performance of the
RBC model is to contrast Table 1 with Table 2, which
presents sample means of relative volatility and con-
temporaneous correlation with output computed for
5. For a very informative tour of the genesis of the shock-based business cycle theory, see Chatterjee (2000).
6. Output is defined as GDP, consumption is defined as private consumption of nondurables plus services, and investment is
defined as nonresidential fixed investment plus consumer durables. All these variables are measured in billions of 1996 dollars.
In addition, labor hours are defined as total manhours of the employed labor force in all industries from the household survey,
measured in billions of hours.
7. The detrending method used in Charts 2–4 is the Hodrick-Prescott filter, which fits a flexible trend through the time series.
The flexible trend reflects the assumption that each of the relevant variables exhibits a slowly changing growth rate over time.
8. Relative volatility is defined as the standard deviation of a variable divided by the standard deviation of output.
9. Subsequent extensions of the real business cycle approach, as labeled by Long and Plosser (1983), have improved the U.S.












































Cyclical Components of U.S. Output, Consumption, Investment, and Labor Hours, 1954:Q1–2001:Q1
Source: Computed by the authors from data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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Labor Hours 0.95 0.87
TABLE 1
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fifty simulations of an RBC model. Each simulation
consists of 189 periods, the same number as the
U.S. data sample.
In the RBC artificial economy, the patterns of rel-
ative volatility are consistent with the U.S. data
reported in Table 1; that is, investment is the most
volatile, followed by output, labor hours, and then
consumption over the business cycle. Based on this
result, one can conclude that changes in total factor
productivity are a possible cause of fluctuations in
GDP, consumption, investment, and labor hours.
Moreover, all model-generated time series are pro-
cyclical in an RBC economy. In particular, output
and consumption are positively correlated over the
business cycle. As discussed earlier, a positive tech-
nology shock (or above-average TFP growth) leads
to higher labor hours and higher real wages; there-
fore, more output is produced, and households raise
their consumption expenditure accordingly. However,
from the RBC point of view, it would make no sense
to blame consumers for an economic slowdown, as
the everyday version of the animal spirits explana-
tion for business cycles would suggest. According
to the RBC explanation, changes in households’
incomes brought about by an unanticipated change
in total factor productivity will induce changes in
both savings and consumption so that the causality
does not run from consumption to output but the
other way around.
So far, this article has identified some inconsis-
tencies between the predictions of the everyday
adaptation of the original animal spirits theory and
predictions of modern macroeconomic models. It has
also presented an example that seems to support the
predictions of modern macroeconomic theories.
Finally, it has noted the success of the RBC theory in
matching the fluctuations of U.S. data. Under these
circumstances, one might wonder whether the non-
fundamental or animal spirits explanation of the
business cycle should be considered obsolete.
According to a new generation of Keynesian econ-
omists, the answer to this question is no. These econ-
omists study the cyclical implications of the presence
of animal spirits in models that meet the modern aca-
demic standards sketched out in the last two sec-
tions. The next section presents a reformulation of
the nonfundamentals explanation that has been put
forward by some Neo-Keynesian economists.
The Neo-Keynesian (Nonfundamentals) Theory
A
ccording to Mankiw (1992b), a prominent
Keynesian economist, at least some new or
Neo-Keynesians agree with the RBC theo-




































































The Real Business Cycle Model
Source: Computed by the authors from data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Bureau of Labor Statistics.7 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2001
be consistent with the micro foundations of the macro-
economy. Mankiw states that “Keynesian economics
has been reincarnated into a body with firm micro-
economic muscle. . . . Beyond the broad principles
. . . old and new Keynesians differ substantially. . . .
To some old Keynesians, new Keynesian economics
may be hard to recognize as Keynesian at all.
Indeed, new Keynesian economics may appear more
similar to the classical economics of David Hume”
(1992b, 560).
Mankiw makes it clear that he is not the
spokesperson for all Neo-Keynesian economists.
However, it is fair to say that he speaks for a large
body of academic economists who see the business
cycle as a type of economywide market failure, as
Keynes did, but who seek explanations that are
firmly anchored in the analysis of the behavior of
households and firms.
Rather than surveying all Neo-Keynesian studies
of the business cycle, this discussion focuses on a
recent Neo-Keynesian analysis by Farmer and Guo
(1994). This particular study was chosen because it
is consistent with the RBC and Mankiw’s view that
macro predictions should be the consequences of
assumptions made at the micro level.10 However,
Farmer and Guo’s analysis is also faithful to the
Keynesian tradition. They pursue a market failure
explanation for the business cycle, and they study
the possibility that animal spirits or nonfundamental
factors could be the driving force behind business
cycle fluctuations. In addition, they were the first
authors to conduct empirical tests of their theoreti-
cal arguments along the lines of the RBC approach,
thereby permitting a straightforward comparison of
their explanation and the RBC explanation.11
Farmer and Guo’s analysis features an important
departure from the RBC paradigm. Specifically, they
postulate constant returns to scale at the firm level
but economywide increasing returns to scale in pro-
duction. The assumption of increasing returns to
scale means that a proportional change in labor and
capital inputs generates a more-than-proportional
change in output.12 To say that an economy experi-
ences economywide increasing returns to scale
means that, although individual firms see themselves
as facing constant returns to scale, all of the firms
taken together experience increasing returns to
scale. Hence, Farmer and Guo assume that propor-
tional additions of labor and capital by all individual
firms result in a more-than-proportional increase in
GDP. This possibility is also known as positive exter-
nalities in the aggregate production process.13
An example of positive externalities is the devel-
opment and widespread use of the Internet. As indi-
vidual firms continue to increase their use of the
Internet, they induce improvements in the distribu-
tion, utilization, and management of information at
the economywide level. Farmer and Guo believe
that the assumption that there are externalities in
the aggregate production process provides a better
description of the production technology in the
U.S. economy than the constant-return assumption
favored by RBC theorists.
Armed with modern analytical tools, some of
which were outlined earlier, Farmer and Guo envi-
sion an alternative sequence of events leading to
economic fluctuations that have nothing to do with
changes in TFP. Suppose, for whatever reason—say,
an unexpected increase in the ratio of total business
inventory to sales—households become pessimistic
about the future of the economy. Fearing that the
investment financed by their savings is not going to
pan out, households lower their savings today. For
a given level of income, this move would result in
higher consumption. But since households are happy
10. Of course, Farmer and Guo (1994) is not the only Neo-Keynesian work on business cycles. It is, however, one that incorpo-
rates most of the elements that academic economists have come to accept as standard in modern macroeconomic models.
For example, Mankiw (1985) presents a static, partial equilibrium analysis with no quantitative analysis of the U.S. business
cycle. On the other hand, Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) and Ball and Romer (1990) both examine general equilibrium
models, but these models are static and contain no quantitative business cycle analysis.
11. An alternative Neo-Keynesian analysis that emphasizes animal spirits as the source of business cycles is that of Gali (1994).
His analysis begins with a different source of economywide market failure: monopolistic competition. This characteristic
would make Gali’s model also an ideal Neo-Keynesian study to contrast against the RBC theory. Farmer and Guo’s model
was chosen instead because its theoretical setup and empirical methodology makes it a more transparent alternative to con-
trast against the RBC approach.
12. See, for example, Farmer and Guo (1994) for a careful justification of this assumption.
13. See, for example, Caballero and Lyons (1992) for empirical support of positive externalities in the U.S. economy.
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Labor Hours 0.76 0.98
TABLE 2
The Real Business Cycle Model of the 
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with their initial choices of consumption (assuming
that households favor smooth consumption pat-
terns), they will reduce their supply of labor just to
the point where they can earn enough to consume
what they were consuming prior to the outbreak of
pessimism. Therefore, employment will be predicted
to fall at this stage.
Since aggregate production in the Farmer-Guo
framework is subject to increasing returns, a
decrease in labor supply may reduce labor produc-
tivity. If so, this decline leads to a drop in the
demand for labor at every level of wages, in turn
leading to a downward shift of the labor demand
curve. Hence, the above outcome of lower employ-
ment in the economy is reinforced. The fall in
employment reduces households’ projected income
streams, thus decreasing their ability to consume
and save. In the end, households’ pessimism
becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy that causes out-
put, investment, employment, consumption, and
labor productivity all to go down.
Notice that, as in the RBC theory, Farmer and Guo’s
theory predicts that the cause of cyclical declines in
output is not lower consumption. Lower consumption
results from a decrease in investment and output
caused by something else—in this case, a sudden burst
of pessimism about investment prospects.
The natural question at this point is, How well do
the simulated data generated by this model match
the actual data featured in Chart 2? Chart 4 shows
that, like the RBC model, the Farmer-Guo model is
able to reproduce the relative variances of U.S. out-
put, consumption, investment, and labor hours over
the business cycle. Similarly, Table 3 shows that, like
the RBC model, the Farmer-Guo model provides a
plausible quantitative description of the cyclical
behavior of key post–Korean War U.S. macroeco-
nomic aggregates in terms of relative volatility and
contemporaneous correlation with output.14
To sum up, the last two sections have described
the driving forces behind business cycles according
to two well-known theories: the real business cycle
theory and the Neo-Keynesian Farmer-Guo theory.
Neither theory supports the notion that fluctuations
in consumption cause the business cycle. Instead,
the theories predict that either random shocks to
total factor productivity or investors’ mood swings
can lead to fluctuations in GDP, consumption, invest-
ment, and labor hours.
Policy Implications
A
s this article has just reported, proponents of
these two explanations for the business cycle











































































Source: Computed by the authors from data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Bureau of Labor Statistics.9 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2001
retical arguments. Both theories seem to achieve a
reasonable fit to U.S. data. Since neither theory can
be written off on empirical grounds, it is interesting
to ask the following questions. What kind of eco-
nomic policies according to these theories might
moderate the business cycle, or insulate households
and firms from aggregate fluctuations, and how
desirable are such policies?
Policy Prescriptions from the RBC Camp.
Imagine, as proponents of the RBC theory claim,
that there really are random and perhaps persistent
changes in total factor productivity. As discussed
earlier, these changes will induce fluctuations in
output, consumption, investment, and so on. Total
factor productivity movements will also induce
changes in the relative scarcity of resources. Under
the assumptions of the RBC theory, inflation-adjusted
wages and interest rates will adjust quickly to
reflect these scarcity changes. Households and firms
will modify their behavior so that they continue to
maximize their well-being and profits, respectively,
through time.
According to the RBC theory, business cycle fluc-
tuations are the optimal responses of households
and firms to random shocks to TFP and hence are
“efficient” outcomes. In this scenario, Adam Smith’s
“invisible hand” will work in the sense that decisions
and actions of the private sector will achieve the
best possible economic outcomes. Accordingly,
under RBC assumptions there is no reason for the
government to implement any kind of “leaning
against the wind” policy—that is, there is no reason
for it to design policies that try to stimulate eco-
nomic activity during a downturn or slow it down
during a boom. The marketplace of households and
firms will engineer adjustments in the opportunity
cost of investment, leisure, and so forth that induce
the optimal responses by its participants.
Consider the following simple example of cyclical
economic behavior in the U.S. economy: the con-
struction industry. Construction booms in the sum-
mer and slows down in the winter. Is there a case for
taking policy actions such as raising interest rates
during the summer and lowering them during the
winter to stimulate borrowing and construction dur-
ing winter (and vice versa) so as to even out the
level of construction throughout the year? Probably
not. No government policies can get rid of summers
or winters. There is a reason for the building booms
of the summer: building in the sun is a lot easier
than building under layers of snow. Why then distort
the market allocation of resources if it produces an
efficient outcome?
Critics of the RBC approach argue that its predic-
tions cannot be fully tested because relatively few
observations of business cycles are available. They
also argue that the TFP-shock story is contrived in
that it does not admit any market failures and that its
explanation for unemployment as a natural market
response is hard to swallow. These critics also point
out that the RBC theory makes a number of assump-
tions that are at odds with reality. Some prices, for
example, do not adjust immediately to economic
conditions. And what if the U.S. economy experi-
ences aggregate production externalities of the type
described in the Neo-Keynesian discussion? These
concerns raise some questions: How seriously should
one take the RBC theory’s claim about the useless-
ness of countercyclical policies? Is there room for
stabilization policies according to the competing ani-
mal spirits explanation of business cycles? And how
desirable are these policies?
Policy Prescriptions from the Animal Spirits
Camp. According to everyday Keynesian economics,
policies that boost private consumption can help
speed up a country’s recovery from an economic
slowdown. As noted earlier, however, this prescrip-
tion is based on analytical methods that do not enjoy
widespread support among academic economists.
The Farmer-Guo model from the preceding sec-
tion meets modern academic standards, but, unlike
the RBC theory, it assumes positive externalities in
the aggregate production process. From this per-
spective, if firms recognized that their individual
actions affected all the firms in the economy and if
they could coordinate their actions, then all could
reap the productivity benefits of increasing returns
to scale. However, by design, economic decisions in
a market economy take place in a decentralized way
and thus make this kind of coordination difficult. As
a result, it is possible for the decentralized decisions
of households and firms to be “inefficient” in the
sense that a central coordinating arrangement
14. As in Table 2, the statistics reported in Table 3 are sample means computed for fifty simulations, each of which consists of
189 periods.
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Labor Hours 0.83 0.98
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would produce a better economic outcome than
Adam Smith’s invisible hand.
The potential inefficiency of the free-market out-
come creates an opportunity for stabilization poli-
cies designed to suppress fluctuations driven by
animal spirits to increase public welfare. For exam-
ple, Guo and Lansing (1998) show that in a Neo-
Keynesian model with aggregate increasing returns,
a progressive income tax can prevent households
from reacting to bursts of optimism or pessimism.
When households experience a burst of optimism
and decide to work harder and invest more, they are
subject to a higher tax rate, preventing their opti-
mism from becoming self-fulfilling. Conversely,
when households experience a burst of pessimism
and decide to work and invest less, they are subject
to a lower tax rate, preventing their pessimism from
becoming self-fulfilling.
But is it necessarily a good idea to eliminate eco-
nomic fluctuations that are caused by animal spirits?
Suppose Farmer and Guo are right and the aggregate
production process in the United States does display
positive externalities. In this case, if all the firms in
the economy cooperated, they could obtain more-
than-proportional increases in output by increasing
their inputs simultaneously. However, since there is
no central coordinating mechanism in a decentralized
market economy, firms cannot take advantage of this
situation under normal circumstances. One can think
of waves of overoptimism as an unintentional coordi-
nating mechanism. For example, if most firms believe
that the “bad” times are over and decide to produce
more, more-than-proportional increases in output
may be observed. This possibility suggests that ani-
mal spirits–induced fluctuations may be a good thing
for the economy. Thus, it is possible that even if the
government can eliminate bursts of overoptimism, it
may not want to.
What is the potential advantage of moderating
economic fluctuations? First, if overoptimism alter-
nates with overpessimism, then the average level of
output might fall more than proportionally to the
decreases in the amount of inputs, leading to unde-
sirably low levels of consumption and investment.
Second, even if fluctuations caused by animal spirits
do not reduce the average level of output, they def-
initely increase the variability of consumption. Since
the economic theory outlined earlier predicts that
households prefer their consumption to be smooth
rather than variable, swings in consumption tend to
reduce public welfare.
As Christiano and Harrison (1999) point out, the
case for stabilizing the economy against fluctuations
driven by nonfundamental forces depends on the rel-
ative magnitude of two opposing factors. On the one
hand, households prefer smooth consumption, so
fluctuations in consumption reduce their well-being.
On the other hand, increasing returns in production
may allow nonfundamental fluctuations to increase
the average level of consumption. As a result, it can-
not be determined a priori whether stabilization poli-
cies will improve the well-being of the economy.
According to the RBC theory, there is nothing the
government can do to eliminate business cycle fluc-
tuations. According to Farmer and Guo, in contrast,
governments may be able to design policies to mod-
erate economic fluctuations. However, Farmer and
Guo cannot recommend countercyclical intervention
unambiguously because it is possible for cyclical
fluctuations to be a net benefit for the economy.
Conclusion
T
his article has outlined two alternative expla-
nations for business cycles: the real business
cycle theory and Keynesian theory. Although
neither theory is without detractors, each is worthy
of review because it exerts significant influence on
opinions about the business cycle inside the aca-
demic economic community.
This article has pointed out that the everyday
version of Keynesian theory predicted that fluctua-
tions in output might be caused by fluctuations in
consumer spending. As a result, one of the reasons
economic commentators follow consumer confi-
dence and spending so closely is that these behav-
iors are viewed as leading indicators of economic
fluctuations. Commentators think that identifying
leading indicators is important in alerting govern-
ment about the stage of the business cycle the econ-
omy is in so that the appropriate countercyclical
policy can be implemented.
This article also reviewed the RBC theory’s
assumption that changes in total factor productivity
are the cause of economic fluctuations. One mod-
ern version of Keynesian theory, on the other hand,
suggests that animal spirits are the cause of eco-
nomic fluctuations. However, this article makes two
points. First, the existence of a causal relationship
that runs from consumption spending to output is
far from well established. In two prominent busi-
ness cycle theories, the real business cycle theory
and the Neo-Keynesian Farmer-Guo theory, causality
runs from output to consumption. Second, although
these theories differ diametrically in some key
assumptions regarding the functioning of the econ-
omy, both theories meet modern academic standards
and do a reasonably good job of matching key fea-
tures of U.S. post–Korean War data. However, neither
theory makes an unambiguous case for counter-
cyclical policies.11 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2001
Should readers conclude from this discussion
that countercyclical policies are clearly a bad idea?
Not necessarily. This review has covered only a
small subset of the Keynesian literature, and it is
possible that other modern Keynesian analyses of
the business cycle may justify countercyclical poli-
cies more forcefully. Moreover, recent work using
the RBC approach, such as Cho and Cooley
(2000), suggests that it may permit more room for
countercyclical policy than RBC theorists have
previously believed.
This article makes clear, however, that two well-
known and widely cited business cycle theories
indicate that there may be no need for countercycli-
cal government policies. This conclusion, no doubt,
will come as a surprise to a number of government
and business economists who have an ingrained
belief in the benefits of such policies. It is important
to remember, however, that attempts to understand
business cycles and the effects and desirability of
government policies that may (or may not) moderate
them are still at a very early stage.
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